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MUCH  CONCERN has  been  expressed  in the financial  press  and  by other  ob- 
servers  about  the prospects  for interest  rates  in 1975.  The  particular  fear  is 
that  the sharp  declines  in short-term  interest  rates  in 1974  will be followed 
by sharp  increases  in both short-  and long-term  rates in 1975 under  the 
pressure  of the massive  federal  deficits  expected  in 1975  and 1976. 
This paper  addresses  two questions:  First, has the movement  in short- 
and  long-term  interest  rates  since  mid-1974  been  unusual  in light  of the  slow 
growth  of money  and the collapse  in economic  activity?  Second,  will the 
large  volume  of deficit  financing,  induced  in part by the tax cuts, lend a 
strong  upward  push  on interest  rates  in 1975?  These  can be two aspects  of 
the same  question,  because  an unexpected  and fundamental  shift  in the re- 
lationships  among  interest  rates,  income,  and money  may  cloud the impli- 
cations  of the deficit  for interest  rates. 
The  Recent  Behavior  of Interest  Rates  and  Money  Demand 
As figure  1 demonstrates,  short-term  rates  peaked  in the summer  of 1974, 
and  have  since  fallen  steeply  until  quite  recently.  Long-term  rates  have  also 
Note: The views expressed  in this paper are my own and do not necessarily  agree 
with  those of the Board  of Governors.  I want to thank members  of the Brookings  panel 
for their  many  constructive  comments  on an earlier  version of this paper. 
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Figure 1. Selected Interest Rates, Monthly Averages, 
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fallen from their peaks, but much more gradually; since November they 
have moved without a clear trend. These moveiiients were accompanied by 
an appreciable slowing in the growth of  nominal income during 1974, 
which, however, remained positive until the first quarter of 1975. Real in- 
come fell throughout 1974, moving into a severe decline in the last quarter 
of 1974 and the first quarter of  1975. While the money stock (MI) grew 
fairly rapidly  in the first half of 1974, after June its growth first slowed and 
then behaved erratically;  on balance, it averaged only 1.4 percent (annual 
rate) from June through January,  before speeding up during February and 
March. 
In light of these patterns, was the large decline in short-term interest 
rates and the much smaller decline in long-term rates to be expected? Was 
the erratic pattern of growth in Ml predictable? The answer to the first 
question is a qualified "yes" and to the second question a qualified "no." 
These answers  arise from an examination of the residuals from regression James L. Pierce  91 
equations  in the SMP  (Social  Science  Research  Council-M.I.T.-University 
of Pennsylvania)  model  that describe  the behavior  of money demand  and 
interest  rates.  If these  equations  exhibit  no unusual  behavior  in their  pre- 
diction errors,  one would infer that the behavior  of money and interest 
rates  during  the  recession  was  to be expected.  If, on the other  hand,  the  pre- 
diction  errors  are  unusually  large,  one would  conclude  that  recent  financial 
developments  were  unexpected. 
The single-period  prediction  errors  from the money-demand  (currency 
plus demand  deposit)  equations  in the SMP model for 1973  and 1974  are 
shown  in figure  2. The  equations  used  to form  the  predictions  of M1  were  as 
follows: 
(1)  ln MC =  0.22 ln PCE -  0.005 ln RTB +  0.88 ln MC- 
Standard  error =  0.003; sample period: 1955:4-1971:4. 
(2)  ln  -0.28ln  MD1-0.06ln  RTB-0.12ln  RSD  y  y 
+  0.08 In  RDIS -0.34  In N-0.05'  RDIS  ~  N 
Standard  error =  0.0068; sample period: 1955:2-1972:4. 
where 
MC =  currency  held by the nonbank  public 
PCE =  personal consumption expenditures 
RTB  = interest  rate on Treasury  bills 
MD = demand  deposits  held by the nonbank  public 
Y=  GNP 
RSD =  interest rate on savings deposits 
RDIS = discount  rate 
y/N  = GNP per capita  in 1958  dollars. 
Actual values of the exogenous  variables  in these equations-real and 
nominal  GNP and  short-term  interest  rates-were used  to form  the predic- 
tions. As figure  2 clearly  reveals,  the equations  seriously  overstated  M1 
growth  in the second  half of 1974.1  What  is more,  the errors  were  several 
times  greater  than those obtained  in earlier  periods.2 
1. All the equation  predictions  in this paper  are single-period  predictions  that have 
set the rho  term  equal  to zero. As a result,  the equations  exhibit  serially  correlated  errors. 
When actual predictions  are made, there is less concern in distinguishing  the role of 
structural  variables  from information  on the error  structure  and an estimated  value of 
rho is used. 
2. As will be shown below, the prediction  of the demand  for demand deposits was 
responsible  for the large errors;  the currency  predictions  were quite accurate. 92  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Figure  2. Actual  and  Predicted  M1, Quarterly,  1973  and  1974 
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Sources: Actual-SMP  data bank; predicted-SMP  model, using money-demand equations (1) and (2) 
given in the text. Mi  =  currency plus demand deposits. 
The  errors  in the  money-demand  relationships  give  some  idea  of whether 
the decline  in interest  rates  in 1974  was smaller  than would  have been  ex- 
pected  on the basis  of past relationships.  The equations  imply  that-given 
the actual  values  of other  exogenous  variables-Treasury  bill rates  of 8.8 
percent  and 8.3 percent  in the third  and fourth  quarters  would  have pro- 
duced  a 6 percent  increase  in M1  at an annual  rate.  Actual  bill rates  in the 
two quarters  were 8.2 and 7.4 percent,  respectively,  which should have 
yielded  a greater  money  demand;  yet actual  M1 growth  was only 2.0 and 
2.2  percent  in those  quarters.3  Thus,  according  to the  money-demand  equa- 
tions,  actual  bill rates  were  sufficiently  low to produce  an M1  growth  in ex- 
cess of 6 percent. 
Treating  the errors  in the equations  as reductions  in the intercept  of the 
money-demand  equations-that is, treating  them as if the money-demand 
equation  "shifted"  downward-makes  it possible  to calculate  the interest 
3. The quarterly  M1 figures  used in the equations are averages of the two months 
surrounding  the end of the quarter;  for example,  the figure  for the fourth quarter  is the 
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rates  required  to achieve  a 6 percent  M1  growth.  To do this, the intercepts 
of the currency  and demand-deposit  equations  in the third and fourth 
quarters  were  adjusted  by each  equation's  error  in each quarter.  With  the 
adjusted  equations,  the Treasury  bill rates  required  to obtain  6 percent  M1 
growth  in the third  and fourth  quarters  were  6.2 percent  and 4.1 percent, 
respectively. 
The  large  errors  in predicting  money  demand  are  sufficient  but  not neces- 
sary  to explain  the  slow  growth  in M1.  The  demand  for  money  provides  pre- 
dictions  of the  money  stock  given  short-term  interest  rates.  With  the  interest 
rates  that prevailed  in the third  and fourth  quarters,  the money-demand 
function  predicted  M1 growth  higher  than the actual. However,  money 
growth  need  not have  been  as slow  as it was.  If bank  reserves  had  been  sup- 
plied at a rate consistent  with more rapid growth  in M1, interest  rates 
would have fallen sufficiently  to equate money demand  with the more 
rapidly  growing  supply  and the money  stock would  have expanded  more 
rapidly.  Thus,  the issue  is not that  the decline  in interest  rates  was so large 
but  rather  that  it was  not large  enough  to spur  more  rapid  expansion  in M1. 
Given  the  actual  decline  in short-term  interest  rates,  the  behavior  of long- 
term  rates  was  not surprising.  The  model's  equation  for the interest  rate  on 
newly  issued  corporate  bonds,  taken  as a measure  of long-term  rates,  is 
18  18  APCONQ+3~C 
(3)  RNI =  0.76 +  ,  b,RCP_j +  E  C  PCON1  +  033  aRCP 
bo =  0.18,  bi =  0.94; co =  4.83,  i =  31.18, 
Standard  error =  0.17; sample period: 1954:4-1971:2. 
where 
RNI = interest  rate on newly  issued  Aaa utility  bonds 
RCP =  commercial paper rate 
PCON = consumption  prices  (percent  change  measured  at annual  rate) 
aRCP  = a measure  of the standard  deviation  of RCP over  the previous 
eight  quarters. 
The equation  did overpredict  the rate  on new issues  in late 1973  and 1974 
by a substantial  amount,  the  maximum  error  being  1.4  percentage  points  in 
the first  quarter  of 1974.  But the pattern  of predictions  captured  the up- 
surge  in long-term  rates  in 1973  and 1974  and the moderate  decline  in late 
1974.  The errors  made  during  the period  appear  to be explainable.  In the 
equation  a distributed  lag on the percentage  change  in consumption  prices 94  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
serves  as a proxy  for the expected  rate of inflation.  The behavior  of this 
price  variable  was  not an appropriate  measure  of expected  inflation  because 
of the rapid  rise  in consumption  prices  relative  to other  prices  during  the 
period.  This  variable  probably  accounts  for much  of the overprediction  of 
the long-term  rate  in 1973  and 1974. 
MONEY DEMAND 
While the declines  in interest  rates may not be surprisingly  large, the 
sizable  errors  in  predicting  money  demand  in the second  half  of 1974  remain 
to be explained.  The search  for explanations  is frustrating  and perhaps 
fruitless,  particularly  because  the errors  may  have  resulted  from  large  ran- 
dom  disturbances.  An effort  to "explain"  the errors  is always  an exercise  in 
ex post theorizing,  which is often difficult  to distinguish  from pure ra- 
tionalization.  If the ex post arguments  appear  to be compelling,  it is crucial 
to test  the role of these  factors  not only  in the current  situation  but also at 
other  times  when  they appear  to operate. 
A separate  look at the model's  equations  for currency  and demand  de- 
posits,  the two components  of M1,  clearly  shows  that the latter  is respon- 
sible  for the overprediction  in 1974;  the very  rapid  currency  growth  during 
the year  was predicted  quite  accurately.  The errors  in the demand-deposit 
equation  in 1974  are several  times  larger  than  those obtained  at any other 
time, whatever  the economic  conditions.  The problem  is to isolate any 
special  factors  at work  in the second  half  of 1974  that  could  account  for the 
extremely  large  errors  in predicting  growth  in demand  deposits. 
Many  of the possible  explanations  of the apparent  collapse  in money  de- 
mand  are  plausible  and serve  to highlight  some of the problems  with con- 
ventional  money-demand  functions.4  These  functions  are of the form 
(4)  ln  -=a  -a  lni-a2  Inr+a3In  Ml, 
where 
M =  money 
Y =  nominal GNP 
4. I have  benefited  greatly  from several  discussions  with Jared  J. Enzler  on the prob- 
lems of money  demand.  For an excellent  review  of the state of the art concerning  money 
demand,  see Stephen  M. Goldfeld,  "The  Demand  for Money  Revisited,"  BPEA (3:1973), 
pp. 577-638. James L. Pierce  95 
y =  real GNP 
N =  population 
r =  interest rates 
al,2,3 =  coefficients  greater  than  zero. 
The negative  coefficient  on real  per capita  GNP, y/N,  implies  a less than 
unitary  elasticity  of money  demand  with respect  to real GNP. The public 
economizes  on money  balances  as real transactions  (for which  y/N is the 
proxy)  rise.  Thus,  an increase  in real  per capita  income  will raise  velocity. 
This  result  accords  with  the microeconomic  inventory  approach  to money 
demand. 
A less than unitary  elasticity  of demand  implies  that a decline  in real 
GNP per  capita,  with  nominal  GNP and interest  rates  unchanged,  will in- 
crease  the demand  for money.  This can be seen when equation  (4) is re- 
written  to obtain 
(5)  M =  aO +  (1  -a3)  ln  Y-a,  lny 
+a  lnN-a2  nr+a3  InM1; 
or, defining  P as a measure  of the price  level so that Y = Py, 
(6)  M=  ao+(  -a3)InP+(I  -a3)Iny-a,lny 
+  a  ln N-  a2 ln r +  a3  ln M 1. 
This  rearrangement  of terms  makes  it clear  that a 1 percent  rise  in P offset 
by a 1 percent  decline  in y will leave  nominal  income  unchanged,  but will 
raise  the demand  for nominal  money  balances,  by a, percent. 
According  to this  specification,  when  real  income  is falling  in a recession, 
the public  will be less careful  in its cash management,  given  interest  rates 
and  nominal  income.  In most recessions,  the movement  of nominal  income 
is dominated  by the  movement  of real  income.  As real  income  falls,  so does 
money  income,  and  predicted  money  demand  falls  with  it, albeit  to a lesser 
degree.  In the  current  recession,  however,  nominal  income  continued  to rise 
because  prices  rose  faster  than  real  income  fell. Thus,  predicted  money  de- 
mand  rose  even  as real  income  fell. 
There  is strong  evidence  that the public has learned  to use its money 
balances  more  intensively  over  time.  Furthermore,  theory  suggests  that  the 
incentive  and ability  to economize  on money are related  to real transac- 
tions  and  to interest  rates.  However,  the behavior  of the public  is probably 
more complicated  than is implied  in conventional  money-demand  func- 96  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
tions.  The  propensity  to economize  on money  balances  probably  cannot  be 
captured  by the elasticity  estimate  on real transactions.  Once individuals 
and  firms  have  economized  on cash  holdings,  they  will  not unlearn  all their 
lessons  when  interest  rates  and  real  transactions  fall. Thus,  in an important 
sense,  money  demand  may not be completely  "reversible."  This ratchet 
effect  should  be particularly  important  when  technological  developments, 
which  may  have  been  stimulated  by high  interest  rates  and  large  volumes  of 
transactions,  are  involved.  Furthermore,  the  upward  trends  in interest  rates 
and real GNP in the postwar  period  make it difficult  to distinguish  the 
effects  of these  variables  on cash  management  from  those of a time trend. 
It is beyond  the scope  of this  paper  to specify  a money-demand  function 
that would  distinguish  among  the factors  that influence  economizing  on 
money  balances.  But  the residuals  from  the SMP  demand-deposit  equation 
should  provide  some insights  into the issue.  If a ratchet  effect  or a trend- 
determined  increase  in the technology  of cash management  is important, 
one might  expect  money demand  to be overestimated  during  recessions. 
However,  residuals  from  the demand-deposit  equation  do not show  such  a 
pattern  for recessions  before  the present  one. 
As a further  test, new projections  were  made  from the demand-deposit 
equation,  (2), using  the past-peak  value  of real  per  capita  GNP rather  than 
its actual  current  value as a crude  means of capturing  a ratchet  effect.5 
Past-peak  income  was  used  so that  the  declines  in real  GNP would  not work 
to raise  the  demand  for  money  relative  to nominal  GNP. The  estimates  were 
reduced  by $2.4  billion  and $4.4 billion  in the third  and fourth  quarters  of 
1974,  respectively,  thus  reducing  by  that  amount  the  residuals  of $6.1  billion 
and  $10.8  billion  for  those  quarters  in the original  projection.  But  the  errors 
were  worse  for previous  recessions  using  this new formulation.  Thus,  the 
evidence  is inconclusive.  Since  1974  is unique  in the number  of quarters  in 
which  nominal  and real GNP moved  in opposite  directions,  and the esti- 
mates  were  improved  for 1974,  the evidence  does suggest  the need  for fur- 
ther  work  on the possible  nonreversibility  of money  demand. 
The  recent  strange  behavior  of predicted  money  demand  might  result,  in 
part,  from  the use of the Treasury  bill rate  in the money-demand  function. 
In principle,  all market  rates  should  be present  in one form  or another;  but 
because  of multicollinearity  the  Treasury  bill rate  was  chosen  as a proxy  for 
5. Since  the function  was not reestimated  using  past-peak  real  income  but was simply 
rerun  applying  the coefficient  for real per  capita  GNP to past-peak  income,  the residuals 
are only suggestive  of the possible  misspecification  of the equations. James L. Pierce  97 
other rates. Recently,  the bill rate has followed a pattern  considerably 
different  from  that for other  rates.  One reason  might be that interest  on 
Treasury  bills  is not subject  to state  and local income  taxes,  so that as in- 
terest  rates  rise,  bill rates  and other  market  rates  increasingly  diverge.  The 
spread  should  be reduced  when  interest  rates  fall. This  factor  could  be im- 
portant  since  some  large  states,  including  New York  and California,  have 
maximum  personal  tax  rates  of 11  percent  or  more.  A second  reason  may  be 
the  recent  very  large  increase  in Treasury  bill holdings  by foreigners.  Some 
of this  unusual  demand  is from  foreign  central  banks,  and  some  apparently 
from  suddenly  rich  Arabs  with  such  strong  preferences  for safety  that  they 
prefer  bills  in spite of the large  rate  differential.  Still another  possibility  is 
that  recent  economic  shocks  have caused  domestic  portfolio  managers  to 
attach  unusually  large  risk  premiums  to private  debt. 
In order  to examine  the importance  of the relatively  low bill rates  in the 
demand-deposit  equation,  the actual  bill rate was increased  in 1974  suffi- 
ciently  to return  it to a normal  relationship  to the commercial  paper  rate- 
which  was probably  more typical of overall  short-term  interest  rates in 
1974.  The actual  bill rates in 1974  were adjusted  by the residuals  in the 
model's  equation  for the commercial  paper  rate,  which  takes  this rate  as a 
function  of the bill rate.6  These  errors  measure  the unusual  spread  that  has 
opened  up between  the bill and commercial  paper  rates.  The errors  for the 
four  quarters  of 1974,  expressed  in percentage  points,  were  0.1, -2.4,  -2.4, 
and  0.3, respectively.  When  these  errors  are added  to the bill rate and fed 
into the demand-deposit  equation,  its original  errors  of $6.1 billion and 
$10.8  billion  were  reduced  by $5.1  billion  and $3.4 billion  in the third  and 
fourth  quarters,  respectively. 
Another  explanation  for  the  collapse  in  money  demand  may  lie in changes 
in compensating  balances  that commercial  banks often require  of their 
loan customers  as a condition  for extending  credit  or lines of credit.  In the 
latter  part  of 1974,  commercial  banks  abandoned  or modified  their  prime- 
rate  formulas  to keep  their  lending  rates  unusually  far  above  market  interest 
rates,  expecting  thereby  to enhance  their  profits  and  to reduce  the share  of 
loans  in their  portfolios.  Under  this pressure,  borrowers  may have shifted 
6. The equation  relates the commercial  paper rate to the current  and one-quarter- 
lagged  values  of the Treasury  bill rate: 
RCP =  0.54 +  0.71RTB  +  0.35RTB.1. 
Standard  error =  0.14; sample  period: 1953:2-1969:3. 98  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
their  business  away from banks  toward  other sources  of credit-such as 
commercial  paper-and taken  their  compensating  balances  with  them,  thus 
reducing  measured  money  demand. 
Given  the  total  lack  of data  on compensating  balances,  the importance  of 
this phenomenon  is uncertain.  However,  the reduction  in compensating 
balances  was  probably  not very  large.  Most firms  that  borrow  in the com- 
mercial  paper  market  must  maintain  credit  lines  at commercial  banks  and, 
hence,  compensating  balances.  Furthermore,  the  terms  on which  borrowers 
regain  access  to credit  at commercial  banks  will depend  in part  on the size 
of the  balances  that  they  have  maintained.  Businesses  would,  therefore,  hes- 
itate  to reduce  their  deposit  balances.  Thus,  the restrictive  lending  policies 
of commercial  banks are unlikely  to have produced  much reduction  in 
compensating  balances. 
Some  argue  that, because  much  of the public  always  holds minimal  de- 
mand  deposits  or because  of innovations  such as NOWs, POWs,  WOWs 
(negotiable  orders  of withdrawal,  payment  orders  of withdrawal,  written 
orders  of withdrawal,  respectively),  and  money-market  mutual  funds,  M1  is 
no longer an interesting  variable.  If  this assertion were correct, one 
would  expect  to see a sizable  shift  into savings-  and  time-deposit  liabilities 
of banks  and nonbank  thrift  institutions.  Such shifts must lie behind  the 
arguments  that higher  orders  of M, such as M2 (M1  plus time deposits  at 
commercial  banks other  than certificates  of deposit)  or M3 (M2 plus de- 
posits  at nonbank  thrift  institutions)  are more  reliable  variables  than M1. 
A shift  away  from  M1  to such  interest-bearing  deposits  would  show  up as 
underpredictions  in the  model's  equations  for  commercial  bank  savings  and 
time  deposits  (other  than  certificates  of deposit)  and  the sum  of liabilities  of 
savings  and loan associations  and mutual savings  banks. However,  the 
errors  show little evidence  of a persistent  tendency  to underestimate  the 
growth  in these  deposits  and  no clear  offset  to the overprediction  of money 
demand  in the  second  half  of 1974.  What  does  show  up  from  these  equations 
are large errors  in both directions:  predicting  those bank and thrift ac- 
counts  is not easy.7 
7. Recent  prediction  errors  do suggest  that these  equations  have  problems.  The major 
difficulty  in predicting  these savings and time accounts appears  to lie with obtaining 
interest-rate  variables  that adequately  measure  the rates  paid by banks  and thrift  institu- 
tions. For a brief discussion  of the difficulties,  see my comments  on William  E. Gibson, 
"Deposit Demand, 'Hot  Money,' and the Viability of  Thrift Institutions," BPEA 
(3:1974), pp. 633-34. James L. Pierce  99 
Many  other  factors  might  explain  the  collapse  in money  demand,  such  as 
the mix of GNP, the volume  of financial  transactions,  the expected  rate  of 
inflation,  the decline  in real  wealth,  and the like. Indeed,  when  all the re- 
visions are made in the GNP accounts  and in the measurement  of the 
money stock, the problem  of explaining  M1 in the second half of 1974 
might  well  disappear. 
While  its recent  behavior  may  be something  of a mystery,  the important 
lesson  appears  to be that no evidence  attests  to a fundamental  structural 
shift  in money  demand.  While  one must  wait  for new observations  to see if 
large  errors  persist,  preliminary  data  suggest  that the prediction  errors  for 
the  first  quarter  of 1975  are  much  smaller.  Thus,  the second  half  of 1974  ap- 
pears  to have  been  an unpleasant  episode,  but  conventional  money-demand 
functions  can  be used  as one tool for analyzing  the future  course  of interest 
rates. 
The  Prospects  for Interest  Rates 
Many observers  have expressed  the concern  that the sharply  increased 
government  borrowing  resulting  from the large deficits  in 1975  and 1976 
will  put  substantial  upward  pressure  on interest  rates  that  will  tend  to choke 
off  the  prospective  recovery.  Those  who  find  this  result  inevitable  argue  that 
if the Federal  Reserve  were to buy a substantial  part of the new debt, it 
would  only  avert  the  rise  in the short  run.  Eventually,  such  an expansionary 
monetary  policy  would,  it is feared,  rekindle  both  actual  and  anticipated  in- 
flation,  and in so doing would cause nominal  interest  rates to rise even 
higher. 
Leaving  direct  comment  on this  argument  aside  for the  moment,  a review 
of the historical  relationship  between  interest  rates and deficits  might be 
useful.  These  two series  are  presented  for 1952  through  1975:  1 in figure  3. It 
is clear  that,  historically,  large  deficits  tend  to be associated  with  recession- 
induced  declines  in revenues  and with declines  in interest  rates.  This his- 
torical  record  certainly  gives  no evidence  of a simple  correlation  between 
large  deficits  and high or rising  interest  rates. 
Perhaps  during  the periods  of deficits  and declining  interest  rates the 
central  bank  was  pumping  in so much  money  that the debt  was effectively 
monetized.  Again,  the historical  record  does not support  this conjecture. 
Figure  4 shows  the annualized  rates  of growth  of M, quarter  by quarter -  -  s  ?  L 
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over  the  same  1952-1975:  1  period.  With  the  exception  of 1958  and 1971-72, 
the  most  rapid  M1  growth  was  associated  with  surpluses  rather  than  deficits. 
This pattern  illustrates  a frequently  procyclical  behavior  of M1 growth 
rather  than  a financing  of deficits  through  monetary  expansion.  Even  in the 
case  of the 1964  tax cut, interest  rates  drifted  up gradually  with economic 
activity;  M1  expanded  in step with the economy  until 1966. 
This  simple  historical  exercise  is intended  only  to demonstrate  that  in the 
past deficits  have not led to the kind of immediate  interest-rate  response 
that  some  observers  seem  to fear  for 1975.  There  is no reason  to believe  that 
deficits  resulting  from  recession-induced  declines  in tax revenues  will spur 
increases  in interest  rates.  Tax cuts and expenditure  increases  do tend to 
raise  aggregate  demand  and, hence,  ultimately  to raise  interest  rates.  But 
when  this  happens,  the  rise  results  from  the  autonomous  increase  in demand 
and not necessarily  from  an increase  in the stock  of outstanding  debt.  The 
question  remains,  however,  whether  a large  increase  in the stock  of govern- 
ment debt associated  with a deficit  such as is now in prospect  will be an 
additional  factor  raising  interest  rates  even further  and thus retarding  the 
growth  in private  expenditures. 
Unfortunately,  conventional  econometric  models  provide  very  little in- 
sight  into the  issue.  They  take  no explicit  account  of the direct  effects  of the 
volume  or composition  of debt  financing  on financial  markets.  Through  a 
series  of identities,  the models  do provide  estimates  of the amount  of debt 
raised  by various  sectors-government,  business,  and households.  Identi- 
ties are  also used  to equate  the various  forms  of saving  to aggregate  invest- 
ment.  However,  the volume  of debt,  as well  as the demand  for it, does not 
directly  affect  interest  rates  in these  models.  Short-term  interest  rates are 
determined  by the interaction  of money  demand  and  money  supply.  Long- 
term  rates  are determined  by term-structure  equations  that relate  them  to 
short  rates.  These  interest  rates  influence  total  spending,  which  in turn  feeds 
back on to money demand  and hence again to interest  rates  in a simul- 
taneously  determined  system.  Thus,  the basic  determinant  of interest  rates 
is the growth  of the money  supply  relative  to current  and lagged  income, 
not the volume  or relative  supplies  of debt. Tax cuts and expenditure  in- 
creases  therefore  will  raise  income  in these  models,  and the increase  in ag- 
gregate  demand  will raise  interest  rates  for any given  money  supply.  The 
large  prospective  volume  of government  debt  qua  debt  will  have  no impact. 
It is worth  pointing  out that these  models  have done a fairly  good  job of 
predicting  interest  rates without  explicitly  allowing  for relative  demands 
and supplies  of credit. James  L. Pierce  103 
The Outlook through  Fiscal 1976 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, assessing the likely course of  in- 
terest  rates over the next year or so requires first some estimate of the course 
of aggregate  demand and prices over that period. George Perry has kindly 
supplied me with his economic projection for 1975, and I have taken the 
liberty of extrapolating  it through the first half of 1976. While one may dis- 
agree with some features of this forecast, Perry's projections (and my ex- 
trapolations) are within the mainstream of current private forecasts. His 
projection has the added advantage of being very recent and of incorporat- 
ing the actual tax program. 
Perry  does not assume significant  "crowding  out" of private expenditures 
in response to a deficit-induced rise in interest rates. Rather, he assumes 
that M1 will grow fast enough to assure constant short-term  interest rates as 
indexed by a 5 1/2  percent Treasury  bill rate over the forecast horizon. One 
test of the "surging interest rate" hypothesis will be to  determine whether 
the Perry forecast is feasible given the prospective deficit and different as- 
sumptions concerning monetary policy. 
INTEREST RATES AND  MONEY DEMAND 
The Perry GNP projection for 1975 and my extrapolations for the first 
half of 1976 are shown in table 1, along with data for 1974 for purposes of 
comparison. The annual percentage changes of GNP,  GNP  in  constant 
dollars, and the implicit deflator for half years are shown in the following 
tabulation: 
Annual percentage change 
Second half  First half  Second half 
1974 to  1975 to  1975 to 
first half  second half  first half 
Economic indicator  1975  1975  1976 
Nominal  GNP  0.25  12.3  10.4 
GNP in 1958  dollars  -8.1  6.9  5.2 
GNP implicit  price  deflator  8.7  5.3  5.0 
As the table shows, the projected expansion in nominal GNP  is quite 
rapid. According to the money-demand function of the SMP model, this 
expansion would require an average growth in Ml in excess of 9 percent to ON  "t  m  rt  m^  tn 
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keep  short-term  interest  rates  constant  through  1975.8  If the sharp  rise in 
government  debt  puts pressure  on interest  rates  beyond  that measured  by 
the money-demand  equation,  an even  more  rapid  growth  in M1  would  be 
required. 
Many  observers  would  argue  that  Perry's  implicit  assumption  about  M1 
growth  is not realistic.  It certainly  does  not accord  with  the 5 to 7.5 percent 
range  recently  announced  by the  Federal  Reserve  ;9  interest  rates  would  ob- 
viously  rise with M1  growth  in this range.  Thus, Perry's  GNP projection 
may be overly optimistic  because  rising interest  rates induced  by slow 
growth  in M1  relative  to GNP would  dampen  private  spending. 
To estimate  the impact  on Perry's  projected  GNP of such an income- 
induced  rise  in interest  rates,  the full SMP  model was first  adjusted  to re- 
produce  Perry's  GNP forecast  quarter  by quarter,  given  constant  interest 
rates. This simulation  generated  the M1 growth projection  mentioned 
above.  Then  M1  growth  was set at 7 percent  and a new simulation  was ob- 
tained.  Doing  this  reduced  GNP by about  $20  billion  by the fourth  quarter 
of 1975  as a result  of the slower  expansion  in M1.  The simulated  Treasury 
bill rate  stood  at 6.50  percent  in that  quarter-a full 100  basis  points  above 
Perry's  5.50 percent  assumption. 
THE DEFICIT 
The simulation  just described  demonstrates  how much  difference  mone- 
tary  policy  can make working  through  conventionally  modeled  channels. 
The  alternative  projections  for interest  rates  had nothing  to do with  the in- 
creased  stock  of government  debt.  The question  still remains  whether  this 
rise in debt will be an additional  force contributing  to a rise in interest 
rates:  Will the prospective  new weight  of the public  sector  in the mix of 
borrowing  raise  interest  rates?  Or,  will the rate  increases  predicted  by con- 
ventional  econometric  models  capture  the relationship  between  rising  GNP 
and  interest  rates,  given  M1  growth? 
The present  state of analytic  knowledge  gives a presumptive  answer  to 
this question.  The efforts  of model  builders  to find an explicit  role for the 
8. In this calculation the equation was adjusted for the large error in the fourth 
quarter  of 1974. 
9. See "Statement  by Arthur  F. Burns,  Chairman,  Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve  System,  before  the Senate  Committee  on Banking,  Housing and Urban  Affairs" 
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relative  supplies  of debt  in the determination  of interest  rates  indicate  that 
once term-structure  effects-which implicitly  measure  changes  in the de- 
mand  and  supply  of credit-are allowed  for, no important  role  remains  for 
changes  in relative  quantities  of credit  in the economy.10  Nonetheless,  in 
view  of the  historic  size  of the government  deficit,  it is worth  looking  at as a 
special  case. 
Figure  5 displays  the amount  of U.S. government  debt  as a percentage  of 
GNP from 1965  through  the first half of 1976,  the last three half-years 
representing  the Perry  forecast.  The  percentage  rises  sharply  in the forecast 
period,  but only  back  to 1969-71  levels,  and  it remains  well  below  those  for 
earlier  years.  Nothing  in the behavior  of this percentage  suggests  that the 
deficit  for 1975  and 1976  will lead to unusually  high levels  of debt relative 
to GNP. 
FLOW OF FUNDS 
The  next  issue  is whether  the  expected  saving  and  investment  flows  are  so 
unusual  that  financing  the  new debt  of the government  will be difficult  and 
thus  push  rates  higher.  To examine  the feasibility  of Perry's  forecast  from 
this perspective  required  integrating  government  and private  financing  re- 
quirements  with  the Perry  forecast.  In a highly  stylized  exercise,  I used an 
estimate  of the flow of funds  likely  to be consistent  with the Perry  GNP 
forecast,  assuming  a sustained  5 1/2  percent  bill rate in 1975 and the first 
half of 1976.11  If the GNP pattern  had implied  "strains"  in financial  mar- 
kets,  in the  form  of unusually  large  shifts  in the  borrowing  and  lending  pro- 
pensities  of the private  sectors,  perhaps  the fears  of extremely  high  interest 
rates  would  be justified  o,  perhaps  the GNP estimate  would be too opti- 
10. See, for example, Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, "Innovations  in In- 
terest Rate Policy," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 56 (May 1966), pp. 178-97; and 
William  D. Nordhaus  and Henry  C. Wallich,  "Alternatives  for Debt Management,"  in 
Issues in Federal  Debt Management,  Proceedings  of a Conference  Sponsored by the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston, June 1973 (FRBB, no date). 
11. The flow-of-funds  projection  thought  consistent  with the assumptions  about pro- 
jected GNP and interest  rates  was kindly  supplied  by Stephen  P. Taylor, of the Federal 
Reserve Board staff. He is in no way responsible,  however,  for the use to which I put 
his projection  or for the conclusions  that I draw  from it. In this connection,  it should be 
noted that flow-of-funds  modeling  is still  an infant  industry.  Existing  models  are "rough" 
and analysis using them is somewhat  unreliable.  One of the newest and best analyses 
using the flow of funds  for longer-term  projections  can be found in Barry  Bosworth  and 
James  S. Duesenberry,  "A Flow of Funds Model and Its Implications,"  in ibid. James L. Pierce  107 
Figure  5.  Ratio of the Stock of U.S. Government  Debt to Gross National 
Product, 1965 through  First Half 1976 
Percent 
40 
35  - 
Ratio  in percent 
30  - 
25  I  I  I  l 
1965  1970  1975 
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Flow of Funds Accounts,  1965-1973" 
(1974; processed), pp. 1, 31; table 1 above. Government debt for 1974 was obtained directly from Federal 
Reserve preliminary  statistics; for 1975-76 the debt figures are projections based on data for the preceding 
years. 
mistic.  If, on the other  hand, there appeared  to be no great  difficulty  in 
achieving  the required  mix  in the  flow of funds,  the fears  of surging  interest 
rates would probably  be without  foundation,  in the sense that monetary 
policy  could  produce  Perry's  projected  path  of constant  short-term  rates. 
Table  2 shows  the various  components  of gross  saving  and gross  invest- 
ment that Stephen  Taylor  has estimated  to be consistent  with the Perry 
forecast. While the identities  require  that saving equal investment,  the 
manner  in which  the balance  is struck  is still instructive.  The accounts  are 
brought  into balance  in 1975  by a $45 billion  rise in private  saving  and a 
$35 billion decline  in private  investment.  The sum of these, $80 billion,  is 
sufficient  to match  the dissaving  of the government  sector. 
The expansion  in private  saving  comes  from  several  sources.  The tax cut 
and the general  rise  in personal  income  stimulates  personal  saving  in 1975. 
Undistributed  corporate  profits  will be down; but the saving  from a re- 
duced  inventory  valuation  adjustment,  which  measures  the rising  replace- 
ment  cost of inventories,  actually  raises  business  saving  on balance  in 1975. 
The projected  decline  in investment  is not the result  of financial  crowding 
out of projects-recall Perry's  assumption  of constant  interest  rates-but 
stems  rather  from  high excess  capacity. 108  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Table 2.  Estimates of Gross Saving and Investment  for 1975-76, 
and Actual for 1974, by Component 
Billions  of dollars 
Half year 
(seasonally adjusted  annual  rate) 
Calen2dar  year 
1975  1975  1976 
Component  1974  1975  first  second  first 
Gross private saving  213.2  258.2  254.8  261.6  267.8 
Personal saving  76.7  105.4  109.4  101.4  94.1 
Undistributed  corporate profits  52.5  33.2  29.6  36.8  42.3 
Inventory  valuation adjustment  -35.5  -8.7  -10.1  -7.2  -3.9 
Capital consumption allowances  119.5  128.3  126.0  130.6  135.4 
U.S. government  surplus  -7.6  -83.6  -86.2  -81.0  -71.4 
State and local government  surplus  1.7  -2.4  -3.1  -1.6  -0.9 
Total gross saving  207.3  172.2  165.6  179.0  195.6 
Gross domestic investment  208.9  179.9  169.4  190.4  213.4 
Net foreign investment  and statistical discrepancy  -1.6  -7.7  -3.8  -11.4  -17.9 
Total gross investment  207.3  172.2  165.6  179.0  195.5 
Sources: 1974 data are from Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, "Flow  of  Funds, 
Seasonally Adjusted, 4th Quarter, 1974, Preliminary"  (February 5, 1975; processed), p. 1. Other data are 
projections by Stephen P. Taylor of  the Federal Reserve System, consistent with the Perry forecasts in 
table 1. For components calculable from table 1, the results may differ slightly because of data revisions 
and rounding.  Details may not add to totals because of rounding. 
The  flow-of-funds  projection  shown  in table  3 tells the story  in a some- 
what  different  way. Total funds  raised  by all nonfinancial  sectors  in 1975 
are  projected  to be only $8 billion  higher  than  in 1974.  The $80  billion  rise 
in U.S. government  borrowing  is almost  totally  offset  by a $72 billion  de- 
cline  in borrowings  by other  nonfinancial  sectors.  Funds  raised  by house- 
holds and nonfinancial  businesses  are projected  to decline  by $23 billion 
and  $42  billion,  -respectively.'2  In light  of Perry's  projection  of a $20  billion 
rise  in the  rate  of personal  saving  from  1974  to 1975,  any source  for strong 
upward  pressure  on interest  rates  from  the  household  sector  is hard  to find. 
Given  this  increase  in saving  and  the forecast  weakness  of housing  demand, 
a sharp  reduction  is projected  in the volume  of funds  raised  on credit  by 
households. 
Table  4 shows  the projection  for 1975  and the first  half of 1976  of gross 
investment  and gross internal  funds generated  by the corporate  sector, 
based  on the Perry  economy-wide  forecast.  Inventory  investment  declines 
sharply  from 1974  levels and corporate  fixed investment  rises only mod- 
erately.  Together,  they  imply  a sluggish  rise  in gross  investment,  which  re- 
12. The  recent  large  volume  of long-term  borrowing  by nonfinancial  businesses  repre- 
sents a restructuring  of business  balance sheets rather  than a strong total business de- 
mand  for funds. James  L. Pierce  109 
Table  3. Funds  Raised  in Credit  Markets  by Nonfinancial  Sectors,  1972-76 
Billions  of dollars 
Half year 
(seasonally adjusted  annual 
rate) 
Calendar  year 
1975  1975  1976 
Sector  1972  1973  1974  1975  first  second  first 
Nonfinancial  sectors, total  169.4  187.4  175.7  184.0  179.2  188.9  211.5 
U.S. government  17.3  9.7  13.0  93.7  97.1  90.3  74.5 
Otherdomestic, total  147.8  170.1  147.2  84.8  77.1  92.5  130.2 
Households  63.1  72.8  42.5  19.4  14.5  24.4  49.5 
Nonfinancial business  70.5  85.1  88.9  47.2  43.7  50.7  57.8 
State and local government  14.2  12.3  15.8  18.2  18.9  17.5  22.9 
Foreign  4.3  7.5  15.5  5.5  5.0  6.1  6.9 
Sources: Federal Reserve System, "Flow of Funds, Seasonally Adjusted, 4th Quarter, 1974, Prelimi- 
nary," p. 2; and Taylor's projections, cited in table 2. Details may not add to totals because of rounding. 
Table  4. Gross  Investment  and  Gross  Internal  Funds  of Domestic 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Business,  by Component,  1974-76 
Billions  of dollars,  except  where  indicated 
Half year 
(seasonally adjusted  annual  rate) 
Calendar  year 
1975  1975  1976 
Comnponent  1974  1975  first  second  first 
Gross investment, total  125.8  106.4  100.4  112.4  128.7 
Fixed investment  115.7  116.2  114.4  118.0  123.1 
Change in inventories  10.1  -9.8  -14.0  -5.6  5.6 
Gross internal  funds, total  81.4  96.3  89.7  102.9  114.6 
Undistributed  profits  34.6  18.7  14.3  23.0  28.0 
Foreign profits  9.8  7.4  8.2  6.5  6.5 
Inventory  valuation adjustment  -35.5  -8.7  -10.1  -7.2  -3.9 
Capital consumption allowances  72.5  78.9  77.3  80.6  84.0 
Ratio of gross internal funds to 
gross investment  (percent)  64.7  90.5  89.7  91.5  89.0 
Sources: Federal Reserve System, "Flow of Funds, Seasonally Adjusted, 4th Quarter, 1974, Prelimi- 
nary," pp. 1, 2; and Taylor's projections, cited in table 2. The calculations are made from data before 
rounding. 
mains  below  the rate  achieved  in 1974  until  the first  half of 1976.  Internally 
generated  funds,  on the other  hand,  are expected  to rise because  of a sub- 
stantial  reduction  in the volume  of funds  required  for inventory  accumula- 
tion as a result  of the slowing  in inflation.  This drop  in IVA also serves  to 
reduce  taxes  paid  on inventory  profits  and  therefore  moderates  the decline 
in undistributed  profits.  Thus,  the corporate  sector  is expected  to be a sig- 
nificantly  smaller  factor  in capital  markets  than it was in 1974.  Over  the 
next  eighteen  months,  the business  sector  should  be able  to finance  most of 
its projected  investment  expenditures  from  internally  generated  funds. 110  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1975 
Figure  6. Funds  Raised  by the U.S. Government  Sector  as a Percentage 
of Total  Funds  Raised  by Nonfinancial  Sectors,  1952-76 
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Sources: Federal Reserve System, "Flow of Funds Accounts,  1945-1972," pp. 4, 5; Federal Reserve 
System, "1974  Supplement:  Flow of Funds Accounts, 1965-1973" (September 1974; processed), p. 2; "Flow 
of Funds, Seasonally Adjusted, 4th Quarter, 1974, Preliminary," p. 2; and Taylor's projections, cited in 
table 2. 
MARKET CONGESTION 
The evidence  presented  so far suggests  that the fears over the interest- 
rate  implications  of the large  increase  in federal  debt are without  founda- 
tion.  The  sharp  increase  in the saving  rate  combined  with  weak  investment 
and housing  demand  should  leave plenty  of funds  for the government  to 
borrow.13  Another  way to get at the issue  is to look at the share  of federal 
finance  in total funds raised.  Conceivably,  if the federal  share  rises fast 
enough,  financial  markets  will become  congested  and  interest  rates  on gov- 
ernment  debt  and  substitute  instruments  will  rise  sharply.  Figure  6 depicts  a 
13. This  conclusion  is similar  to one reached  independently  by John Lintner,  "Savings 
and Investment  for Future  Growth, 1975-76  and Beyond"  (paper  prepared  for the Con- 
ference  on Inflation  and Recession,  The Conference  Board, New York City, April 8-9, 
1975;  processed). James L. Pierce  111 
Figure 7.  Share of U.S. Government  Securities in Total Private Domestic 
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Sources: Same as figure 6 (pp. 78, 27, and 3, respectively, of the published sources given). 
time  series  of the ratio  of federal  debt to total nonfinancial  funds  raised.  It 
clearly  shows  that, in 1975  and 1976,  the government  deficit  will be large 
relative  to the total borrowing  needs  of the nonfinancial  sector  as the U.S. 
government  moves  from  its relatively  minor  role in financial  markets  to a 
major  role-indeed, for a time, an unprecedented  one. 
While  this shift in the weight  of the public  sector  in the borrowing  mix 
may  disrupt  financial  markets-and one could  already  see signs  in the early 
months  of 1975  in the  U.S. coupon  market-it does  not imply  any  dramatic 
shift  in the composition  of the public's  portfolio  of assets.  Figure  7 shows 
that,  while  the share  of U.S. government  securities  in total  private  domestic 
holdings  of credit-market  debt  is expected  to rise  in 1975  and 1976,  it will 
still be very  low by postwar  standards. 
Although  some congestion  may develop  in the government  securities 
market  from  time  to time,  it cannot  last long. Since  the participants  in this 
market  have had ample time to prepare  for the deluge of securities,  the 
congestion  is unlikely  to be severe.  While  interest  rates  on government  se- 
curities  may  rise  somewhat  relative  to those on private  issues,  this change 
seems  unlikely  to push  up the general  level of interest  rates. 
The financial  situation  also offers  no reason  to doubt the feasibility  of 112  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1975 
Perry's  forecast-at least  in broad  outline.  The  flow of saving  from  the tax 
cut will directly  and indirectly  find  its way into the government  securities 
market  and the economy  should  finance  the deficit  with little strain.  The 
course  of interest  rates  thus  will depend,  as usual,  on monetary  policy  and 
not on the deficit.  If monetary  policy proves  to be much  more restrictive 
than  Perry  assumes,  his forecast  will be too bullish.  This outcome  would 
result  from  the conventional  effects  of monetary  restriction  and not from 
the large  increase  in government  debt. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Stephen  M. Goldfeld:  In the first  part  of his paper,  Pierce  looks at the 1974 
behavior  of money  markets,  and an important  part of this exercise  is the 
relation  between  interest  rates  and money  demand.  In the second  part,  he 
looks at the likely  course  of interest  rates  during  the next several  quarters, 
and  again  the relation  between  interest  rates  and money  demand  is of cen- 
tral  importance.  However,  what  the past tells us about  the future  for this 
relation  is left somewhat  uncertain,  and  Pierce  makes  no special  allowance 
for 1974's  surprises  in his projections.  Pierce  also discusses  the extra  im- 
pacts  on interest  rates  that might arise  from the large  budget  deficit  that 
lies  ahead,  and  finds  little  reason  to expect  any.  So he ends  up with  a down- 
the-middle  forecast  that implies  that interest  rates  will rise considerably  if 
the Federal  Reserve  holds to a modest  growth  path for M,. I do not dis- 
agree  with  this  assessment.  But  Pierce  raises  some  provocative  issues  before 
reaching  dead  center  and I would  like to comment  on some of these. 
The basic  puzzles  in the first  part  of the paper  are  the large  residuals  in 
the  third  and  fourth  quarters  of 1974  in the money-demand  equation  of the 
SMP  model.  As Pierce  notes,  these  large  residuals-in which  actual  money 
demand  was $6 billion  and $11 billion  below  predictions  for the third  and 
fourth  quarters-in no way explain  the slow growth  of M, of this period. 
The Fed could have made money grow faster  if it had wanted  to-there 
was not even  anything  unusual  in the relation  between  bank  reserves  and 
the money  supply;  but achieving  this faster  growth  would  have required 
pushing  interest  rates down much faster.  Thus, the point of the exercise 
cannot  be to explain  the past growth  of M,, but rather  must  be to under- 
stand  the working  of the demand  function  so as to help predict  the M, 
requirements  for the future.  In this spirit,  Pierce  considers  a number  of 
reasons  why  money  demand  may have been  unusually  low. 
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Before  considering  these,  I can report  the residuals  from some alterna- 
tive money-demand  equations  that I have run for this same period.  The 
basic  equation  has a structure  similar  to the one presented  by Pierce.  The 
other  two equations  add the change  in wealth  and the inflation  rate as 
explanatory  variables.  The  residuals  from  these  three  equations,  which  were 
estimated  with data through  1973, are presented  below for the quarters 
since  then: 
Five- 
quarter 
Actual  minus  predicted  M1  root 
(billions  of dollars)  mean 
Equation  square 
1974:1  1974:2  1974:3  1974:4  1975:1  error 
Basic  -2.5  -0.4  -4.5  -6.7  -1.2  3.8 
With  wealth  -1.5  -0.9  -4.0  -5.5  -1.5  3.2 
With  inflation  -0.9  -0.1  -3.1  -4.5  -0.8  2.5 
A few  things  are  worth  noting  in these  residuals.  The basic  equation  has 
large  errors,  but  not nearly  as large  as those  that  Pierce  reports  for  the third 
and  fourth  quarters.  The  wealth  and  inflation  variables  reduce  the  residuals 
for these  quarters  somewhat  further,  indicating  that they may belong  in a 
specification  of money  demand.  All the equations  are  nearly  back  on track 
by the first  quarter  of 1975,  which  suggests  that whatever  the mystery  was 
in the second  half of 1974,  it has little importance  for the future.  This is 
also Pierce's  conclusion.  Finally,  in connection  with  the second  part  of the 
paper,  I also included  the budget  deficit  in the basic equation  and it did 
nothing,  although  this test has problems  because  the equation  was in logs 
and the deficit  had to be put in linearly. 
I have  a few  comments  on the explanations  Pierce  offers  for  the  (perhaps) 
unusual  behavior  of money  demand  last year.  First,  the fact that a decline 
in real  income  gives  a less  than  proportional  decline  in money  demand  need 
not imply  unlearning  in the sense that Pierce  worries  about. On a trans- 
actions  view  of the demand  for money,  the conventional  model  has people 
optimizing  on money  holdings  and would predict  the kind of result  that 
Pierce  describes.  Unlearning  or forgetting  has nothing  to do with this. To 
the extent  that there  is something  else in the empirical  results,  it may be 
that real  income  is not the thing to look at. Perhaps  innovations  have in 
some sense  produced  shifts in money demand  that conventional  analysis 
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for isolating  any ratchet  effects  that come from innovation.  Such effects 
could be part of the 1974  story  even if they did not show up in previous 
recessions-simply  because  they are  new phenomena.  Or it might  be that, 
whether  real  income  or interest  rates  is the interesting  variable,  the changes 
are  much  steeper  in the current  situation  than in past recessions.  In either 
case,  Pierce  has raised  a point that deserves  further  work. 
Pierce  looks at the savings  flows  to commercial  banks  and thrift  institu- 
tions  to see if M2  or M3  was  better  predicted  than  M1.  Part  of the problem 
in the poor predictive  power  that he reports  for these  equations  may  lie in 
the interest  rate  that is used.  I think  the SMP  model  uses a rate  that has a 
5 ?/:  percent  ceiling,  and  if it does,  the effect  must  be to understate  both the 
height  of effective  rates  and the variation  in rates  over  past quarters. 
When  Pierce  turns  to projecting,  he makes  no special  allowance  for the 
residuals  in the money-demand  equations  for 1974. His main message  is 
that  the fairly  rapid  growth  in real  and  nominal  GNP projected  by Perry  on 
the basis  of a constant  5 1/2percent  Treasury  bill rate  is unlikely  to be con- 
sistent  with  a growth  in the money  supply  anywhere  near  as slow as 6 per- 
cent. Indeed,  the money  supply  would  probably  have to grow faster  than 
10 percent  to conform  to the Perry  forecast.  This relationship  among  the 
three  variables-GNP, interest  rates,  and the money  supply-gives Pierce 
his main  handle  for projecting  interest  rates  for various  scenarios.  I would 
use the same  handle. 
Pierce  also addresses  the government  deficit  as an additional  factor  that 
might  affect  interest  rates.  Here  his basic  approach  is to examine  the flow- 
of-funds  analysis  provided  by Taylor  on the basis  of the Perry  forecast.  But 
there  is probably  such  a big subjective  element  in the flow-of-funds  break- 
down that one could expect to find crowding  out only if Taylor,  in his 
judgment,  included  it. 
To develop  a satisfactory  analysis  from  this kind  of exercise,  it would  be 
useful  to compare  interest  rates  and the corresponding  flows  from  Taylor 
with a complete  constellation  of interest  rates  from  the GNP forecast  and 
various  assumptions  about  the money  supply.  One  could  then see whether 
those  two sets  of rates  were  roughly  matched  or badly  mismatched.  This  is 
asking  a lot from  the  present  state  of the art  in flow-of-funds  work,  I know, 
and Pierce  himself  makes  all the proper  disclaimers  about  the state  of that 
art.  But  if this  work  is ever  going  to convince  people  about  something  that 
they now do not fundamentally  believe  in, it will have to begin  by under- 
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David  I. Fand: Pierce  has written  a very  interesting  paper,  which  takes  up 
several  important  macroeconomic  policy  issues.  The  first  part  of the paper 
analyzes  monetary  developments  last year  and provides  an understanding 
of the forces  currently  shaping  money  demand  and interest  rates.  Pierce's 
analysis  of the 1975-76  deficits  in the second  part offers  a thoughtful  as- 
sessment  of the credit-market  and  interest-rate  problems  that  the economy 
may  face  in the next twelve  to eighteen  months. 
Pierce  first  considers  the large decline  in short-term  rates, the smaller 
decline  in long-term  rates,  and the sluggish  growth  in Ml in the third  and 
fourth  quarters  of 1974.  Using the money-demand  function  in the SMP 
model,  he calculates  that Treasury  bill rates  of 8.8 and 8.3 percent  (in the 
third  and  fourth  quarters,  respectively)  should  have  generated  a 6 percent 
growth  in M1  in the second  half of 1974.  The actual  bill rates  in these  two 
quarters-8.2 and 7.4 percent,  respectively-were  below those calculated 
in the SMP  model  for 6 percent  growth,  yet Ml growth  was only slightly 
above  2 percent  over  those  two quarters.  The question  Pierce  confronts  is 
whether  interest  rates  fell too much or money  grew  too little. 
Pierce  concludes  that the sharp  decline  in short-term  rates  was not sur- 
prising,  and that the moderate  decline  in long-term  rates was not out of 
line with the term-structure  equation  in the model. Since movements  in 
interest  rates  conformed  to the model, the sizable 1974 errors  in Ml are 
viewed  as  the  consequence  of a downward  shift  in the money-demand  equa- 
tion.  And since  the model  predicted  the very  rapid  currency  growth  during 
the year  quite  accurately,  Pierce  associates  the 1974  residuals  for M1  with 
a downward  shift  in the demand-deposit  function.  While  the 1974  residuals 
are  large,  it may be helpful  to test whether  they are  large  enough  to reject 
the null hypothesis  of no shift. 
Several  hypotheses,  such as the "nonreversibility"  of demand,  changes 
in compensating  balances,  the use of a modified  Treasury  bill rate, and a 
shift  from  Ml to other  monetary  assets,  are introduced  to rationalize  this 
shift  in money  demand,  but  those  that  help  reduce  the 1974  residuals  do not 
work  for earlier  downturns.  Pierce's  ex post analysis  of residuals  cannot 
satisfactorily  rationalize  the assumed  shift in money  demand. 
The  strategy  of associating  the large  residuals  with  a shift  in the deposit 
function  leads  Pierce  to a systematic  analysis  of the factors  that could ac- 
count  for  the change.  And while  this constructive  approach  does  not as yet 
provide  a satisfactory  explanation,  it may do better  when  the revised  data 
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as reflections  of a temporary  disequilibrium,  following  a large  and precipi- 
tous decline  in real  income. 
Although  the recent  behavior  of money  demand  is viewed  as something 
of a mystery,  Pierce  finds  no evidence  of a fundamental  structural  shift  from 
Ml toward  savings  and time deposits  and nonbank  intermediary  claims. 
Indeed,  the preliminary  data for the first  quarter  of 1975  indicate  smaller 
prediction  errors.  Pierce  argues,  therefore,  that  the  Fed could  have  achieved 
a 6 percent  growth  in Ml in the latter  half  of 1974  if it had  supplied  a larger 
volume  of reserves. 
Pierce's  analysis  of 1974  is that, in the collapsing  economy  of 1974,  the 
interest-rate  targets  were  not lowered  fast enough  to avoid  sluggish  money 
growth.  A similar  analysis  of money  demand  and  interest  rates  in a surging 
economy  would  indicate  that interest-rate  targets  have not kept  pace with 
money-market  rates,  and therefore  accelerated,  even explosive,  monetary 
growth,  may  occur.  One  possible  conclusion  is that  interest-rate  targets  are 
not the  appropriate  way  to implement  monetary  policy,  especially  when  the 
economy  is undergoing  transition. 
Pierce's  analysis  of the prospective  1975-76 budget  deficits  reveals  his 
considerable  annoyance  at the tenor  of recent  discussions.  He is especially 
concerned  over  some  widely  publicized  statements  that  foresee  large  deficits 
crowding  out private  investment  expenditures  and  choking  the prospective 
recovery,  but that give no explicit  analysis  of the forces  shaping  aggregate 
demand  in the next two years. 
Pierce  argues  that there  is no simple,  direct,  or automatic  link between 
deficits  and  interest  rates,  and  that  the most  rapid  M1  growth  was  typically 
associated  with surpluses  rather  than deficits  (see his figure  3 on federal 
budget  deficits  and interest  rates  and  figure  4 on annual  rates  of growth  in 
M1).  The historical  record  does not, in Pierce's  view, support  the notion 
that  large  deficits  produce  high or rising  interest  rates,  nor does it support 
the associated  fears  that explosive  money  growth  will inevitably  follow  the 
large  1975-76  deficits. 
This  approach,  illustrated  in figures  3 and  4, which  compares  contempo- 
raneous  deficits,  interest  rates,  and rates  of monetary  growth  is not, how- 
ever,  satisfactory.  In assessing  the impact  of deficits  on interest  rates  one 
should  distinguish  between  Walter  Heller's  "passive"  deficits  and "active" 
deficits-that is, between  an endogenous  deficit  reflecting  weakness  in the 
economy  and a discretionary  deficit  reflecting  a change in fiscal policy. 
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ciated with the low interest  rates. Also, while an increase  in the active 
deficits  may,  in time,  cause  interest  rates  to rise,  this effect  may not be de- 
tectable  econometrically  without  allowance  for lags.  Even  if deficits  do not 
exert  a major  contemporaneous  influence  on interest  rates,  they could still 
have a significant  net effect  among  the other  factors  affecting  rates.  Simi- 
larly,  in the search  for a statistical  link between  the active  deficits  and M1 
growth  rates,  the lagged  effects  of discretionary  deficits  on money  growth 
should be investigated,  as well as their initial influence  on a broader 
monetary  total such as M2. 
Pierce's  table  1,  incorporating  Perry's  forecasts  for  real  and  nominal  GNP 
and for the deflator,  indicates  a rise  of over 11  percent  in nominal  GNP in 
the next twelve  months.  With  the Fed's recently  announced  target  of 5 to 
7 1/2percent  growth  in M1, the implicit  speedup  in velocity  from the first 
half of 1975  to the first  half of 1976  is between  3 and 6 percent,  and sup- 
ports  Pierce's  suggestion  that the projected  rise  in GNP relative  to the as- 
sumed  growth  in money would  be associated  with an increase  in interest 
rates.  This does not conform  with Perry's  forecast,  which  assumes  a con- 
stant  bill rate. In contrast,  the flow-of-funds  evidence  in table 3 indicates 
that  the $80  billion  rise  in government  borrowing  in 1975  is offset  by a $72 
billion decline  in borrowing  by other sectors,  and suggests  that the pro- 
jected federal  deficit  can be financed  without great pressure  on interest 
rates. Pierce  points out that the flow-of-funds  methodology  is still being 
developed,  and I do not see that its implications  for interest  rates are as 
telling  as those available  from comparing  the GNP estimates  presented  in 
table 1 with  the Fed's  monetary  targets. 
Pierce's  discussion  of the deficit  and  its impact  on interest  rates  points  up 
the need to define  the alternative  policies.  For example,  if a large  budget 
deficit  is essential  to revive  the  economy  within  a given  time  frame,  the defi- 
cit cannot  validly  be associated  with  any crowding-out  effect;  indeed,  there 
is a filling-in  effect.  Alternatively,  if a desired  GNP path can be achieved 
without  a deficit,  or with  a smaller  deficit,  then  there  is some  kind  of crowd- 
ing out. Consequently,  if the focus  is on a given  GNP path  and  if this path 
can be achieved  with alternative  policies  incorporating  larger  or smaller 
deficits,  the benefits  and costs of these alternative  policies  should  be con- 
sidered.  Determining  whether  a projected  deficit-even a large one-will 
cause  interest  rates  to rise  and  crowd  out private  investment  expenditures  is 
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This  policy  issue  is very  similar  to the one  faced  by the Kennedy  adminis- 
tration's  Council  of Economic  Advisers  when  it debated  the  merits  of alter- 
native  methods  of stimulating  the economy  in 1962.  Some  favored  deficits 
to stimulate  consumption  and  were  willing  to accept  tighter  money;  others, 
seeking  to stimulate  economic  growth,  favored  an easier  monetary  policy 
and  were  willing  to accept  tighter  fiscal  policy.  In my opinion,  discussion  of 
the current  problem  would  be improved  if, like the 1962  debate,  it focused 
more explicitly  on the relative  merits  of alternative  policies designed  to 
achieve  a given  GNP path. 
In spite  of Pierce's  excellent  presentation,  I am still  puzzled  as to the im- 
pact  of deficits  on inflation  and  interest  rates.  In the last decade,  and espe- 
cially  since  1969,  the nation  has had large  deficits,  high  rates  of monetary 
growth,  high  inflation,  and high  interest  rates.  One wonders  whether  some 
mechanism  links  these  elements,  or they  just happened  to move  together  in 
recent  years.  In my view, this conjuncture  is not a happenstance.  But if 
this interpretation  of the inflation  in the last decade  is accepted,  and if the 
1975-76  deficits  are  not to ignite  a new inflationary  spiral,  policy  must  as- 
sure  that  these  deficits  do not lead  to an acceleration  in money  growth,  and, 
indeed,  that  the  economy  returns  reasonably  soon to a noninflationary  path 
for money  growth. 
General  Discussion 
A good deal of discussion  centered  on the relation  between  deficits  and 
interest  rates.  William  Fellner  argued  for analyzing  the issue of crowding 
out  private  borrowing  in the framework  of policy  alternatives.  Low  interest 
rates  reflecting  rapid  money  growth  and  large  deficits  reflecting  tax  cuts  and 
spending  increases  represent  alternative  ways  of achieving  recovery.  Choos- 
ing to stimulate  the economy  through  a heavy reliance  on deficits  means 
higher  interest  rates  than would otherwise  occur.  Hence, the composition 
of output  will  differ  from  that  under  the same  stimulus  with  lower  rates  and 
a smaller  deficit.  Interest-sensitive  demands,  such as housing  and business 
investment,  will  be lower  with  the  large  deficit  than  with  the  alternative  pol- 
icy.  In turn,  lower  investment  will  result  in less  productivity  growth.  Robert 
Hall continued  this line of thought,  maintaining  that, to the extent  that 
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phasize  expansionary  monetary  policy  to cure  it. Because  the extent  of the 
diminution  of the effect  of fiscal  policy  through  crowding  out is unknown, 
it is difficult  to know  how expansionary  fiscal  policy  should  be. 
James  Tobin  agreed  that  the crowding-out  issue  should  be viewed  in this 
framework  of alternative  policy mixes,  as Fand had also suggested  in his 
remarks.  But he emphasized  that in doing  this, the path of GNP and em- 
ployment  had to be the same  for each policy  combination  that was being 
considered.  For a given  path of GNP growth,  substituting  fiscal stimulus 
for monetary  stimulus  would produce  higher  interest  rates and, in this 
sense,  crowding  out. But the public  discussion  about  deficits  was  not being 
conducted  in terms of an agreed-upon  GNP path. The alternatives  that 
were  being  argued  were  not all sufficient  to do the same  job of recovery.  In 
particular,  if fiscal  policy  were  made  less expansionary,  achieving  the same 
degree  of recovery  would require  a faster  growth  of the money supply. 
Franco  Modigliani  argued  that help from  both monetary  and fiscal  policy 
was in order.  The Pierce  projections,  as well as others  that he had seen, 
indicated  that even with the fiscal stimulus  now in place, a very expan- 
sionary  monetary  policy  would  be needed  to achieve  anything  like the 6 to 
8 percent  rate  of real  expansion  that  Perry  was  projecting.  The  issue  arising 
from  the Pierce  paper  was  whether  even  this amount  of monetary  stimulus 
would be forthcoming.  No one was contemplating  the still faster  growth 
in M1  that would  be needed  if the GNP expansion  were  to be fueled  with 
monetary  policy  alone. 
Marina  Whitman  believed  that any discussion  of crowding  out had to 
take  account  of the international  financial  market.  Not only would  interest 
rates  in the United States  affect  rates  abroad,  but there  would  be an influ- 
ence  in the other  direction  as well.  If U.S. corporations  have  trouble  raising 
funds in the U.S. market,  they will borrow  in the Eurodollar  market  or 
somewhere  else abroad.  And foreign  and financial  capital  can be attracted 
to the U.S. market  if interest  rates  are favorable  or for any other  reason, 
such as a changed  assessment  of the political  climate  or of the dollar's 
prospective  value. 
Lawrence  Klein suggested  that the simple  correlation  between  deficits 
and  interest  rates  in the  historical  record  that  Pierce  presented  was  not suffi- 
cient evidence  on the relation  or lack of it between  these  two. He argued 
that it is the change  of interest  rates  that one might  expect  to be related  to 
the deficit,  and reported  that he had found a weak relationship  using an 
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serves,  along  with  the deficit.  Klein  also  noted  that  the  flow-of-funds  analy- 
sis did show  that big changes  were  coming  in the sectoral  composition  of 
saving  and investment  balances,  and suggested  that such big changes  in 
themselves  might  imply  greater  frictions  in achieving  the needed  financial 
flows.  Joseph  Pechman  pointed  specifically  to Pierce's  projection  that the 
ratio  of federal  debt to GNP would  rise by 5 percentage  points,  while  in 
previous  recessions  it had not risen  at all noticeably.  Pierce's  analysis  had 
not really  addressed  the issue of how this change  would  be smoothly  ac- 
commodated.  George  Perry  noted,  however,  that the real concern  was for 
the  course  of private  interest  rates.  To the  extent  that  the government  would 
have to borrow  exceptionally  large sums, the private  sector as a whole 
would  have  to borrow  exceptionally  little.  If some  average  of interest  rates 
is maintained  by monetary  policy,  this  relative  shift  to government  borrow- 
ing should  cause  a decline  in private  interest  rates  relative  to the average. 
Tobin  added  that,  on the same  grounds,  one would  want  to know  whether 
an unusual  change  were  taking  place  in the relative  amounts  of long- and 
short-term  borrowing,  since  such a change  would  suggest  a change  in the 
term  structure  relative  to its normal  pattern. 
Charles  Schultze  noted  that,  even  if deficits  and  money  demand  (or inter- 
est  rates)  were  not related  historically,  they  might  be in the coming  months 
because  a significant  part  of the deficit  will come from  the one-shot  rebate 
of taxes.  This  rebate  may  temporarily  expand  money  demand  to the extent 
that  households  consider  it a temporary  increment  to wealth  that  they  plan 
to spend  quickly.  The money supply  required  to hold interest  rates con- 
stant  could  be 2 percent  higher  when  the rebate  is first  paid out. And this 
additional  requirement-an 8 percent  increment  to the annual rate of 
growth  for one quarter-would come on top of the rapid  growth  rates  of 
money  demand  already  projected  by models  such as Pierce's. 
Several  discussants  commented  on the 1974  errors  in the money-demand 
equation  that Pierce  reported.  Tobin noted that these equations  assumed 
that money balances  were in equilibrium.  However, demand deposits 
should  also  be viewed  as a sink  for unintended  differences  between  cash  re- 
ceipts  and  expenditures  by individuals  and  businesses.  A counterpart  to dis- 
appointing  sales  and  unintended  accumulation  of inventories  would  be dis- 
appointing  receipts  and an unintended  fall in money balances.  Pierce 
acknowledged  the possibility,  but noted that residuals  like those of 1974 
did  not appear  in previous  recessions  when,  presumably,  similar  sales sur- 
prises  and similar  unintended  inventory  buildups  occurred.  Martin  Feld- 122  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
stein  thought  that  the large  spread  between  the commercial  paper  rate  and 
Treasury  bill rate  would  help  to explain  the spread  of innovations  such  as 
money-market  mutual  funds  in 1974  and  thus  the residuals  in conventional 
money-demand  equations.  Arthur  Okun  replied  that it was unlikely  that 
movements  into these assets came primarily  at the expense  of demand 
deposits. 
Feliner  expanded  on the results  reported  by Stephen  Goldfeld.  He rea- 
soned  that  inflation  may have  been  an especially  important  factor  in 1974 
money  markets.  Historically,  the inflation  rate  and  interest  rates  may  have 
moved  together  to such an extent  that the inflation  rate was not an im- 
portant  separable  factor in the demand  for money and other financial 
assets.  But because  of interest-rate  regulations  and the exceptionally  high 
rate  of inflation,  rates  could  not track  price  increases  as well this time. 
William  Poole found  the interest-rate  differentials  between  government 
and  private  debt  a much  more  important  feature  of recent  experience  than 
the residuals  in the money-demand  equation  for the last half of 1974. 
Money-demand  equations  are continually  being revised and improved 
and  residuals  beyond  the sample  period  are  not uncommon.  However,  the 
huge  gap that has opened  up between  the bill rate and private  short-term 
interest  rates  has persisted  for a long time and is more  difficult  to explain. 
Daniel  Brill  emphasized  structural  elements  in bank balance  sheets  as an 
important  reason  for the wide  discrepancy  in rates.  Banks  were  in a highly 
illiquid  position,  partly  because  so much  of their  capital  was  tied up in bad 
loans to real estate investment  trusts. This situation  helps explain why 
banks  are so reluctant  to make loans and why prime  lending  rates  have 
remained  so high relative  to other  money-market  rates.  On the view that 
business  loans are the short-run  dynamic  factor causing  changes  in M1, 
this reluctance  to make  loans and the high bank lending  rates  that result 
from  it make  the  Treasury  bill rate  a particularly  inappropriate  variable  for 
explaining  money demand  at this time. The position of banks will also 
make  it particularly  hard  for the Fed to generate  an expansion  in business 
loans.  Despite  these  factors,  Pierce  commented  that the relation  between 
bank  reserves  and  the money  supply  was not behaving  in an unusual  way. 